All submitted proposals are reviewed by the Grants Committee and submitted to the Foundation Board of Trustees for approval at their annual meeting.

The Foundation is committed to fulfill the provisions of the Brenes-Espinach legacy, which is to promote all aspects of oral health. Although the Foundation remains flexible enough to consider innovative projects in all areas of dentistry, including practice and education, it does place special emphasis on programs that increase access and provide dental care to the deserving, but inadequately served public.

The maximum dollar amounts for grants are $5000 for PFA Section Programs under the Section’s control and in which a significant number of Fellows participate; $10,000 for Service Projects that provide increased access to dental care for the public in need; $5000 for educational programs including continuing education; and $5000 for approved miscellaneous programs that fall within the guidelines.

The Foundation will NOT fund (1) multi-year projects, although at its discretion it may allow a grant to span a two-year period; (2) capital projects or purchases of major equipment that costs over $1000, nor land or building acquisition; (3) indirect costs, such as university or institutional overhead;

Only non-profit, tax-exempt organizations and individuals employed by such organizations (with the exception of the student scholarships) are eligible to receive Foundation funding. In the United States and its protectorates, a proposal submitted by other than a tax-exempt organization, will be returned. Organizations outside the United States and its protectorates must be recognized as a tax-exempt entity in its own country and be governed by that country’s appropriate rules. All organizations shall agree to take full legal and administrative responsibility for their projects.

If you, or your organization, believe you qualify for a Foundation Grant, please explain why, in writing, with your request for the application form, and any other necessary information to the Foundation Executive Director. Everything goes through the Executive Director first.

All grant applications and requests must be submitted in the English language.

Such examples of those receiving this year’s grant awards are:

• The Massachusetts Section for conducting a program for identification of lost or abused children, using the Toothprint Program. This is an extension of their 2002 program, which has been a highly publicized activity. This project has served many children with large acclaim for its huge success by law enforcement agencies. The program is being extended into other areas of the State.

• The Kentucky Section is sponsoring a program for providing sealants for a large group of neglected children.

• The Japan Section is involved in a most laudable project to bring dental care to elderly residents living in far isolated islands of the Nagasaki Region.

With all the panic and publicity surrounding the great FAIDS (fear of AIDS) epidemic of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s one critical fact is often missed. There are not (and never have been) any documented cases of dental workers getting occupational HIV/AIDS. Our profession has spent billions of dollars and person-hours on questionable disposables, research, training, legislation, regulation and litigation in an effort to prevent a disease that has never occurred occupationally in dental workers. There are, however, a reported seven “possible” non-documented cases of occupationally acquired dental HIV/AIDS, which are continuously referenced as the only “solid” evidence that HIV/AIDS is a serious concern for dentistry. This paper will examine the scientific aspects of these cases and how “soft” this “solid” evidence really is.

Panic—The Dr. Acer Case

The one issue that threw the nation into a panic and damned dentistry in the mind of the public was the Dr. David Acer case where an AIDS infected Florida dentist (using recommended Universal Precautions) was alleged to have transmitted the virus to 5 (later 6) of his dental patients. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC), a division of the U.S. Public Health Service under the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, mishandled the scientific, statistical and media aspects of this case causing wide spread confusion. The “infected patients” were finally identified with high-risk behaviors and in a following governmental investigation, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reported: “...CDC could not identify, on the basis of its investigation, exactly how HIV was transmitted to the 5 patients.” “...this case provides little specific information to advance an understanding of how to prevent such occurrences in the future.”

Litigation, big-buck settlements, unremitting media publicity and panic muddied the issue and established the public’s perception (as well as many in the profession) that dental care could easily transmit HIV/ AIDS. Serious questions were asked about the conclusions the CDC made in this case but they fell on deaf ears. The GAO and other agencies recommended that the Acer case be considered an anomaly and not be used for policy decisions. Unfortunately the “horse was out of the barn” and the Acer case became the symbol of AIDS dangers; not the exception that it really was.

This alarmist climate resulted in heavy pressure on the dental profession to show that the public was “safe” in the dental office and numerous laws, regulations and procedures were enacted to give this appearance. Many dental journals and supply manufacturers saw a boom in disposables advertising and sales. Self proclaimed “experts” and infection control organizations proliferated, generating millions of dollars in educational schemes. Dental offices were awash in latex, wrappers and sterilants. The U.S. Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, publicly stated, “Getting AIDS from a Health Care worker is essentially nil.” Using a few occupational seroconversions among the world’s non-dental health care workers as a rational, the CDC supported draconian governmental regulatory measures, which gave an opposite message. The Surgeon General’s advice was ignored by the media and the public. Gradually the panic diffused and dissipated as FRAIDS fatigue and clearer minds prevailed. The constant media attention became old and boring. The public saw that, in spite of the doomsayers and activists’ predictions, very few people were going to die of AIDS; especially middle class, heterosexuals. AIDS was not a disease of average Americans.

Serious questions about the Acer case, the effectiveness of Universal Precautions, the CDC’s accuracy, rampant fraud/waste in many AIDS organizations and the obvious miniscule dangers of AIDS transmission caused many exhausted people to calm down and take a second look at the situation. In the 1990’s annual AIDS case numbers began to significantly fall. AIDS was clearly identified as a preventable and treatable, chronic disease predominately affecting homosexuals, IV drug users and their sex partners. New medications made AIDS a “tolerable” disease, cleared out hospital wards and allowed many of the infected, who otherwise would have quickly died, to live relatively comfortable, productive lives. The epidemic was over and dentistry, with the exception of the Acer case, had not been implicated.

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